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“Since the coronavirus, what has been happening is a different strain of anti-Asian racism
than the kind to which I’m accustomed. Not the kind in which we are invisible or we’re
seen as efficient cyborgs. Racism never disappears but adapts to new circumstances when
old strains rise from the dark vaults of American history.” - Cathy Park Hong, from Minor
Feelings: An Asian American Reckoning, February 2020.
On March 16th, 2020, President Donald J. Trump posted a Tweet: “The United States will be
powerfully supporting those industries, like Airline and others, that are particularly affected by
the Chinese Virus. We will be stronger than ever before!” (Yam). This Tweet marked the first
public and recorded instance of the term “Chinese virus”, heralding the emergence of similar
referents such as “China virus,” “Wuhan virus,” and “kung flu” for COVID-19. With a single,
seemingly innocuous post, Trump opened the floodgates for an outpouring of hatred and blame
pointed towards anyone perceived as an A/AAPI.

Word of the virus spread even faster than the virus itself, infecting all who heard of this novel
coronavirus with fear for their lives and livelihoods. But COVID-19 was not the only pandemic
to ravage American society. With her classes and book tour canceled, professor Cathy Park Hong
recounts the time she spent immersed within the frenzied panic of the internet, and the worrying
increase of anti-Asian hate crimes populating her newsfeed. Her writing reflects the shock of
bearing witness to these violent physical and digital crimes, both online and from personal
encounters: “I never would have thought that the word “Chink” would have a resurgence in
2020” (Hong).

The past few years of pandemic exposed several simmering problems in American society.
COVID-19 laughed in the face of our apparent preparedness and continues to leave a trail of
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tragic sickness and death against a complexly interwoven background of economic hardships,
political squabbles, and institutional racism. The virus is a monster, and that’s what we call it.
The 2019 novel coronavirus is a natural force that we as individuals, governments, and global
organizations still struggle to understand and desperately attempt to control. Yet COVID-19
itself is not the scariest monster of the 2020s. COVID-19 is the precursor to a much longer battle
and much tougher enemy, the final poke that woke the monster of prejudiced erasure and
scapegoating—a monster that does not only attack, but infects, turning its chosen victims into
monsters themselves.

Thesis and Methods

My thesis aims to examine monstrification as a rhetorical trope, largely reliant on metaphor and
synecdoche, in COVID-19, through elite messaging, specifically in its unique targeting of
A/AAPI communities. By rhetorical trope, I refer to the ways public discourses turn attention
and inevitably shape public knowledge, belief, and ultimately, action. Beyond the obvious
monstrous appeals to COVID-19, I argue that the monster trope not only enables, but is
necessary for the scapegoating of A/AAPI throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The elite
rhetorics of political authorities used to describe COVID-19, most prominently, the “Chinese
virus,” employs monstrification to simultaneously erase humanity and amplify infectious,
fearfully fatal Otherness, providing justification for violence against A/AAPI. Amidst this
violence, I also endeavor to identify cultural inoculations against such harmful troping through
exploration of emerging resistant rhetorics. I do so by analyzing a selection of key texts that
embody overt, complicit, and resistant rhetoric to the monstrification of A/AAPI.
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By overt rhetoric, I refer to the often explicit, and arguably always intentional usage of antiA/AAPI terminology, such as the “China virus,” or other similar metaphors that align A/AAPI
with COVID-19 in a blameworthy fashion. By complicit rhetoric, I refer to the unintentional
furthering of anti-Asian sentiments. All too often, in attempts to either provide neutral
information or even in the efforts to raise awareness and support for a certain cause, writers and
reporters perpetuate anti-A/AAPI sentiments regardless of their initial intention. In this way,
such language complicitly reinforces the harmful association of A/AAPI as foreign and
monstrous Other, regardless of their history in the U.S. or personal citizenship. As a quick caveat
regarding my definitional use of intentional versus unintentional, I specifically address
intentionality or lack thereof in terms of monstrification—does the text in question intend to
blame, scapegoat, and monstrify, or is the monstrification an unintended consequence? Secondly,
I re-emphasize my chosen scope on how such rhetoric affects A/AAPI, not the complicated ways
that global politics may be invoked in such discussions. By resistant rhetoric, I refer to the efforts
by scholars and activists to reveal and criticize the dangerous implications entrenched in terms
like “Chinese virus”, effectively serving to begin dismantling the monster trope that labels
COVID-19 as a vicious synonym for A/AAPI communities.

My textual artifacts primarily consist of two categories: selections directly from Trump, and
articles produced in reaction to proliferation of both COVID-19 and elite messaging concerning
COVID-19. Specifically, I examine overt rhetoric through Donald J. Trump’s repeated use of
terms like “China virus” to create a narrative of blame as an authority figure. Elite messaging is
particularly key as it both connotes a sense of credibility and retains wider reach to the general
public. I then address complicit rhetoric via harmful stereotypes implied by authors like Walter
Russell Mead and representatives like Chip Roy, as well as internalization of toxic stereotypes
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by popularized A/AAPI advocates such as Andrew Yang. Complicit rhetoric does not have to
use the primary terminology of “Chinese virus” to stimulate similar strains of violence against
A/AAPI. Rather, complicity’s danger lies in its assumed and typically internalized manifestation
of anti-Asian sentiments. My textual analysis finishes with resistant rhetoric in reflections by
professor Cathy Park Hong and a speech from Representative Grace Meng during the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. Their significance lies
in offering A/AAPI and allies alike ways to critically approach overt and complicit rhetoric,
uncovering the violence they generate and perpetuate.

I begin with a discussion of tropes, particularly those which negatively impact A/AAPI
communities, before explicating the monster trope and monstrification. After establishing how
these tropes build upon one another, I utilize Burkean theories of dramatism, scapegoating, and
the comic corrective to analyze overt, complicit, and resistant rhetorics regarding COVID-19 and
anti-Asian violence.

However, prior to delving into the bulk of my thesis, I wish to briefly examine the troped
referent “A/AAPI”, and my choice to use this rhetorical signifier to turn attention towards those
most vulnerable to COVID-19 monstrification. This signification is distinct from the more
commonly used “AAPI”, abbreviation for Asian American Pacific Islander, or the new and more
inclusive “APIDWA”, abbreviation for Asian Pacific Islander Desi West Asian. I prefer
A/AAPI, with the extra A representing Asians in America. By Asians in America, I do not refer
to born Asian Americans or naturalized Asian citizens, but Asians who live in America but do
not have citizenship. This choice stems from the rhetorical insight that in cases like casual racial
assumptions that breed discrimination, citizenship does not matter. Rather, it is imperative to
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focus on lived experience. How did American public perceptions of Asian-ness warp due to
negative COVID-19 attributions, and how did those changes manifest in reactions to perceived
Asian-ness—both against A/AAPI and within A/AAPI? For the purposes of this study,
perceptions of Asians in America are no different from Asian Americans, and so they must be
included in my referent. Furthermore, regarding my choice of referent A/AAPI over APIDWA, I
do so for two main reasons: COVID-19, as well as my own subject position as a CantoneseJapanese American, both call for a focus on East Asian and East Asian passing communities.
While I do seek to expose the erasure of South and West Asian countries in the category of
Asian-ness, the bulk of my subject material is based in the United States, produced by and for
American audiences. Thus, the American cultural and physical association of COVID-19 to
Wuhan, and by extension, China, pushes the burden of viral blame onto East Asian and East
Asian passing peoples.

On Tropes, Metaphor, and Synecdoche
The familiarity of the word trope may signal literary studies.1 However, tropes were first
theorized by Aristotle in his classical and canonical work, The Art of Rhetoric. Rhetoric, in this
classical tradition, is not related to literature, but imbues public argument across genres of
politics, law, and cultural beliefs. Tropes exist beyond the scope of literature, pervading our
public discourses, and circulating through news cycles, everyday conversations, even
architectural objects and material culture. We can define trope as a rhetorical term for the way
discourses and artifacts turn attention to shape public opinions and attitudes, informing our
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Heinrich Lausberg exemplifies a premier academic text situating tropes in and for the literary
tradition, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, originally published in 1960.
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shared life. They “...operate to shape cognition and action” (Bates). Tropes amplify a particular
narrative, and in doing so, suppress or erase non-relevant content and context.

There are hundreds, thousands of possible tropes that we invent, enact, and assimilate every day.
However, according to Kenneth Burke, there exist in Western Civilization four overarching
master tropes (Burke). These master tropes are metaphor, irony, synecdoche, and metonymy. All
four of the master tropes represent main ways of inventing, interpreting, and understanding
meaning making in public life. Scholars like Hayden White further condense this categorization,
arguing that synecdoche—when certain emphasis of a part becomes representation of its
whole—and metonymy—when focus on a characteristic of a referent grants a specific weight to
interpretation of that referent—are sub-categories of metaphor (White). This reasoning draws
upon metaphor, synecdoche, and metonymy’s common use of understanding the unfamiliar
through allusions to what is familiar. In other words, all three of these tropes rely on appeals to
similarity to convey understanding. By contrast, irony offers the opportunity to understand the
unfamiliar via intentional difference—the traditional meaning of any given argument exists in
distinct opposition to its contextual, circumstantial meaning.

Metaphors, and by extension, synecdoche and metonymy, are inevitable products of human
communication. After all, metaphor is useful for framing difficult concepts—by associating what
is unfamiliar with something easier to digest, an audience may better perceive and is often more
likely to accept the given argument. However, the power of metaphors extends beyond shaping
thoughts alone, for “...when a metaphor becomes the structure for how we think about a topic,
they make some goals, plans, actions, and outcomes thinkable and others unthinkable…” (Bates).
The repetition of metaphors that rely upon dangerous assumptions continue to warp possibility
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for understanding into a form of troped oppression and suppression: “The constant deployment
of the metaphor make perceptually required goals, policies, and actions that emerge as further
ways to actuate and activate the structure of reality engendered by the metaphor” (Bates). Within
the context of COVID-19 and the elite messaging of “China virus,” such rhetoric shapes
perceptions of A/AAPI as deserving of punishment, encouraging cultural violence reflected in
demonstrations of racist attitudes and the increase of hate crimes against Asians.

Tropes Shaping A/AAPI
Perpetuated, harmful tropes of origin seize this space between human and monster, monstrifying
A/AAPI. Tropes of origin, especially applied to humans, turn attention to a person or
population’s perceived origin, which usually manifest in an often reductive or generalized
prioritization of ethnic or racial background. As such, these tropes of origin often employ
synecdoche. Synecdoche itself is not monstrous. However, when synecdoche becomes so
generalized as to erase the bodies, voices, and cultures of others in favor of a singular chosen
narrative, it turns into a violent trope of origin. In the case of viewing Asia as a monolith,
“…Such a synecdoche can serve sources of racism and xenophobia either directly or
complicitly” (Mifsud). Said articulates orientalism as “…a Western style for dominating,
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient…because of Orientalism the Orient was not
(and is not) a free subject of thought or action” (Said). In order to understand and consequently
control what it deems as exotic and savage, Western institutions must frame that which it deems
different as Other, or Orient. For the British, the term “Asian” calls India to mind because of the
British empire’s historical rule in that subcontinent. By contrast, the United States had greater
involvement with East Asian rather than Southeast or South Asian countries. American
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familiarity with Japanese and Chinese immigrants turned them into referents for all of Asia. 2
This sentiment is an inherited stereotypical perception, culminating in the modern day “…sense
that East Asians…are viewed as more synonymous with the term Asian than others” (Zhou).
Beyond its erasure of other Asians outside of those perceived as East Asian, the Asia as a
monolith trope of origin enables several other tropes that further build the mask of A/AAPI
monstrification. Most crucial to this paper are the intersections between the perpetual foreigner,
model minority myth, and the yellow peril.

In his remarks to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution, Civil Right, and Civil
Liberties, President and Executive Director of AAJC John Yang discussed how the tropes of
perpetual foreigner and model minority myth act as roots for racism against A/AAPI. The
perpetual foreigner stereotype effectively serves to undermine the inclusivity supposedly granted
to A/AAPI through U.S. citizenship, whether it be born or naturalized. Because of one’s Asian
appearance or alternate proximity to Asia, “…we are still seen as the other, not to be trusted and
to be feared” (Yang, HJS). As activist and scholar Harsha Walia notes in her university lecture
series about dismantling borders, it is difficult, if not impossible, for hyphenated communities to
simply exist as American (Walia). Even though very few of those residing in America could
claim indigenous origin to their occupied space, dominant white power forms a sort of
synecdoche—to be white or white-passing is to be American, and anyone who does not pass
must be perpetually foreign Other. Perpetually foreign Others cannot claim the same privileges
allotted to those who fit the criteria of origin, regardless of their actual citizenship, which is

2

The concept of the Orient is also a synecdoche that this thesis does not have the proper space to
dissect. For further explanation, scholars such as Mae Ngai and Charles Kraus theorize a
particular branch known as American Orientalism.
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supposedly the criterion for claiming those privileges. Applied to the cases of overt and
complicit rhetoric against A/AAPI, the Asian-ness of their named identity overrides any proof of
American-ness they could offer, whether legislative or societal.
On the other hand, the model minority myth suggests “…that Asian Americans are held up as
good people of color when it is convenient to plant seeds of division within allied communities
of color” (Yang, HJS). The model minority myth may not seem harmful—indeed, some A/AAPI
interpret this as a sort of praise, a reward for achieving a high level of success despite their
exclusion and status as a minority. Unfortunately, as theorized by political scientist Claire Jean
Kim, the model minority myth “…exaggerates Asian American prosperity, homogenizes this
extremely diverse population, and obscures discriminatory treatment against it” (Kim, 118). This
pretense of A/AAPI flourishing pits Asian American against groups marginalized by the same
system of oppression, like the Black and Hispanic communities. Furthermore, the model
minority myth disregards the internal socioeconomic and cultural discrepancies with less
prominently represented Southeast or South Asian American people, breeding resentment
between unique A/AAPI communities. Statistics presented by the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition list some of these disparities amongst A/AAPI communities: “Indian
Americans have the highest income among Asian American subgroups, with a median income of
$100,000…[while] Burmese Americans make a median income of $36,000…According to 2017
Census data, Filipino Americans faced a 6.0% poverty rate, compared to the 16.2% for Hmong
Americans…Mongolian, Sri Lankan and Malaysian Americans have bachelor’s degrees with
high rates, 59%, 57% and 55%...Bhutanese, Laotian, and Cambodian have the lowest rates of
attaining bachelor’s degrees, at 11%, 14% and 17%” (Asante-Muhammad and Sim). Simply put,
internalization and acceptance of the model minority myth crafts a facade of acceptance
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particularly prominent in complicit rhetoric, covering the tension and animosity it nurtures
between A/AAPI and other minorities, or even with other A/AAPI communities.
The yellow peril, the last of my chosen tropes, “…is thought to have been coined by Wilhelm
II…who commissioned a painting…[that] called on the civilized nations of Europe to defend
against Asian conquest” (Lee). Yellow peril heavily rests upon the implication of sheer number.
Early iterations of yellow peril, such as those found in the 1875 Page Act propaganda, used the
threat of contamination and horde ideation to vilify Chinese female immigrants, depicting them
as prostitutes that would pollute the whiteness and virtue of the United States. This trope gained
momentum in the years leading up to World War II, plaguing American thought as “…Whites
continued to view Japanese immigrants and their descendants as the enemy within, harbingers of
the “yellow peril” posed by Japan’s steady ascendance during the prewar period” (Kim, 116).
Fear concerning Japan’s military prowess saturated U.S. propaganda, cementing the American
perceptions of Japan as a horrible monstrous enemy, as well as casting suspicion onto A/AAPI
immigrants and citizens. During the era of COVID-19, the yellow peril, often characterized as a
plague, seems altogether too fitting, reducing A/AAPI to an infectious and devastating disease
both overtly and complicitly.

The Monster Trope and Monstrification
The monster trope is as it sounds—it turns attention from someone or something’s normal
attributes into that of a monster. Regardless of what form or figure the monsters saturating
mythology, cinema, or generic urban legends might take, they share embodiment of a
mysterious, horrifying, unknown Other. After all, creatures so ugly, devious, and evil could not
possibly be like us. Monsters cannot be human.
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And yet, the scariest monsters are very human. A wild animal’s snarl cannot compare to the
unearthly howl of a werewolf. Mosquitoes do not inspire the same spine chill as the silent
approach of a blood-sucking vampire. Our frequent use of technology does not assuage the
suspicion and panic of sentient robot attacks. In other words, the most horrifying monsters creep
along the boundary between human and Other. Monsters are our deepest fears personified. They
allow us to gaze upon something that is part of ourselves, but refuse to confront within ourselves.
In doing so, monsters afford humans the perfect vehicle for violence we could never imagine
inflicting upon humans—after all, subjecting humans to pain and suffering would make us
ourselves monsters.

The monster trope is, at the very least, effective in mobilizing support against a common enemy
through fear of the monster in question. Fear saturated reports from various news sources, with
government officials like Governor Mike DeWine of Ohio explicitly monstrifying the virus: “It’s
in our most rural counties. It’s in our smallest communities. And we just have to assume the
monster is everywhere. It’s everywhere” (Achenbach). Trump himself used similar agency,
calling the response to waves of infection as a medical war with COVID-19 itself as the
“…genius, a hidden enemy, and a monster” (Burdick). In these instances, monstrification
displays its duality to personify and thus amplify agency. By giving COVID-19 agency as a
monster, it is no longer just a coronavirus, like the common flu. This allusion to monstrosity in
political speeches, official health announcements, and pandemic news updates draws attention to
lives lost, economies shaken, and building tensions, giving our various pandemic hardships a
common root cause and enemy worthy of fighting. Viruses do not have the literal capacity to
fight, yet even scientists and health experts who are well-aware of the virus’ non-agency tolerate
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phraseology that connotes monstrosity to the public. While advocating for the importance of
vaccination, Chief Medical Advisor Anthony Fauci “...agreed with MSNBC’s Mika Brzezinski
when she suggested that a new “monster” strain could make the delta variant look like child’s
play” (Goldiner). In examples like these, monstrification imbues something that is non-human
with somewhat human characteristics, so perhaps one would call monstrification a form of
personification.

By employing the monster trope in our arguments and affect, we employ a uniquely powerful
form of simultaneous dehumanization and amplification. Through monstrification, we not only
distance ourselves from our chosen enemies, but we produce an amplification via
simplification—generalizations of monstrous behavior or characteristics become the foundation
for our justified violence against Others. If seeing an individual as human is the antidote to
monstrification, then drowning individuals within a multitude produces the opposite effect. As
noted by political activist and historian Mike Davis, we lose personal connection in favor of
widespread ambiguity: “Great epidemics, like world wars and famines, massify death into
species-level events beyond our emotional comprehension. The afflicted, as a result, die twice:
their physical agonies are redoubled by the submergence of their personalities in the black water
of megatragedy…” (Davis, 45).

Monstrification plays a critical role in application to AAPI communities because it replaces the
dehumanizing trope of silent and diligent compliance, or as Hong describes, the “efficient
cyborg” symbolization, with the monster trope’s dehumanization and amplification that depicts
A/AAPI as foreign enemy. A/AAPI have constantly suffered from the trope of erasure, whether
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it be from maintenance of the model minority myth or the poor generalization of various A/AAPI
communities into an Asian monolith. However, COVID-19 and the subsequent monstrification
of A/AAPI as bearers of the virus forced these people groups struggling to garner national
attention into the bonfires of a monster hunt.

Our simultaneous fear of the unknown and fascination with the horrific play against one
another—rather than escape their scariest monsters, people return to gape in terror and fight back
with greater fervor. As both the diversity and population of monster-based media has multiplied
over the years, scholars responded in kind with the development of monster theory. In Monster
Culture in the 21st Century, professors and editors Marina Levina and Diem-My T. Bui offer the
rudimentary beginnings of a modern comprehensive monster theory, arguing “…that monstrous
narratives of the past decade have become omnipresent specifically because they represent
collective social anxieties over resisting and embracing change in the twenty-first century”
(Levina and Bui, 2). In essence, without the human struggle synonymous with societal change,
monsters would not have the space to thrive. With that in mind, Levina and Bui also claim
“…monstrosity has transcended its status as a metaphor and has indeed become a necessary
condition of our existence in the twenty-first century” (Levina and Bui, 2).

In all its monstrosity, what is COVID-19 if not an enormous catalyst of change? The
representational approach links the concept of repression to the Other. Social norms dictate our
preference for certain physical, social, and cultural characteristics, which we then internalize as
the familiar. The dominance of metaphor builds upon these preferences, restricting human
capacity to view and understand things through association and assimilation with the familiar
(Sutton and Mifsud). Without the capacity to view and understand things outside the realm of the
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familiar, “…The true Otherness is then a repressed unfamiliar familiar, or the uncanny” (Levina
and Bui, 4). The wolf is never as scary as the werewolf, for a wolf lacks human intelligence and
agency. In other words, the proximity to humanness makes a monster truly frightening. By that
same reasoning, COVID-19 as a microscopic infectious jumble of genetic code and proteins is
not as scary as A/AAPI monstrified into physical manifestations of the pandemic.

It is the culmination of such tropes that carve a distinctly vicious niche for A/AAPI
transformation into COVID-19: “We don’t have coronavirus. We are coronavirus.” (Hong). The
simultaneous erasure of a group’s humanity while amplifying their monstrosity provides a
scapegoat for those upset by the tragedies and hindrances borne of COVID-19. This metaphor
not only enables racism, but grants reason for violent discrimination and hate crimes.

Anti-Asian metaphors and synecdoche, enabled by the monster trope and justified by elite
messaging, becomes enthymematic to any discourse, political or social, pertaining to COVID-19
as “Chinese virus.” For instance, a study from UC San Francisco analyzed over one million
hashtags found in Tweets the week before and after Trump’s March 16th use of “Chinese virus.”
The researchers found that “...One fifth (19.7%)...with #covid19 showed anti-Asian sentiment,
compared with half (50.4%)...with #chinesevirus. When comparing the week before March 16,
2020, to the week after, there was a significantly greater increase in anti-Asian hashtags
associated with #chinesevirus compared with #covid19 (P<.001)” (Hswen). Elite messaging, like
that of former President Trump, combined with the ease of repetition enabled by social media
platforms like Twitter, allow harmful metaphors like those encapsulated within “Chinese virus”
to breed both violent sentiment and action. As the lead researcher, Yulin Hswen, observed:
“These results may be a proxy of growth in anti-Asian sentiment that was not as prevalent
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before…Using racial terms associated with a disease can result in the perpetuation of further
stigmatization of racial groups” (Kurtzman). This data suggests a strong relationship between
usage of “Chinese virus” and more frequent expression of anti-Asian hashtags. Tropical turning
of attention helps explain how this referent encourages violence.

Analytical Framework

Before proceeding, I wish to offer descriptions of the general categories overt, complicit, and
resistant. To briefly reiterate, by overt, I reference explicit and often intentional usage of antiAsian sentiment. By complicit, I reference unintentional perpetuation of anti-Asian sentiment.
By resistant, I reference criticisms and dismantling of overt and explicit anti-Asian sentiments.
In addition, Burkean critique is especially pertinent to this thesis. Burke’s concept of the
terministic screen offers us another way to analyze inevitable tropes in public discourse, like the
metaphors and synecdoche that enable monstrification, and his theories of dramatism and
scapegoating help explain how the monstrification of A/AAPI infects our media consumption so
powerfully. A terministic screen “…necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than
another. Within that field there can be different screens, each with its ways of directing the
attention and shaping the range of observations implicit in the given terminology…” (Burke via
Bizzell and Herzberg, 1344). Pertaining to the pandemic, one might consider how a biological
understanding of COVID-19 as a viral molecule was racialized and politicized to blame China,
and by extension, A/AAPI. As this attribution proliferates via repeated elite messaging, news
cycles, and social media sharing, it becomes an enthymeme, a syllogism that relies on
implications inherently understood by the audience (Aristotle via Bizzell and Herzberg, 180).
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The metaphors and synecdoches most commonly wedded to A/AAPI, such as perpetual foreigner
or yellow peril tropes explicated previously, become enthymematic to any discourse referencing
COVID-19 as “Chinese virus”. The violence this referent justifies and encourages needs no
further outward explication, because the enthymeme’s deductive form already exists within the
viewer. This induces active response rather than passive conveyance, paving the path for
techniques known as dramatism and scapegoating: “If action is to be our key term, then drama;
for drama is the culminative form of action…But if drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then
victimage. Dramatism is always on the edge of this vexing problem, that comes to a culmination
in tragedy, the song of the scapegoat…” (Burke via Bizzell and Herzberg, 1347). Here the
attribution of COVID-19 to A/AAPI is a contemporary instance of dramatism, presenting AsianAmericans and passing peoples as a scapegoat for any and all inconveniences and tragedies
associated with the virus.

However, Burke also offers us an avenue of both resistance and prevention through the comic
frame. Frames of rejection, found in literary forms like elegy, burlesque, and grotesque, are illsuited to bring about social change. This is primarily because they tend to single out a particular
human vice and proceed to lament on its shortcomings, rather than offering resolutions to the
issues in questions. Generally, frames of rejection do not present society with new perspectives,
and so do not easily inspire changes in personal philosophy. In contrast, frames of acceptance,
examples including epic, tragedy, and comedy, do equip people with the capacity to accept
jarring events and their place in the world: “…the comic frame is not about seeing humor in
everything; it is about maximum consciousness— “self-awareness and social responsibility at the
same time.” The comic frame is…a flexible, adaptive, charitable frame that enables people to be
observers of themselves, while acting…” (Ott). In other words, comic framing helps mitigate the
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problems of scapegoating by allowing audiences to empathize with those at fault, leading them
to a kind of humane enlightenment. It promotes humility over humiliation, presenting a more
receptive environment for learning.
Overt Rhetoric: Trump’s “Chinese Virus”
Regardless of one’s opinion of Trump, his former position as President of the United States
inherently magnifies the importance of his words. This is especially true amidst the panic and
chaos of a traumatizing event like a pandemic outbreak. The general populace, whether willingly
or begrudgingly, do look to the government for a sense of direction concerning the threat to their
daily lives. Trump’s language and overt rhetoric during this time did provide a direction—by
turning attention towards and scapegoating, Asian and Asian-passing bodies as causal to the
tragedy wrought by COVID-19.

Trump’s Twitter activity presents us a general timeframe for the initial usage of “Chinese virus”
and similar phrasing. On January 24, 2020, his initial response to news of the highly contagious
virus was complimentary of China’s President Xi: “China has been working very hard to contain
the Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency. It will all
work out well. In particular, on behalf of the American People, I want to thank President Xi!”
(Sippell). Trump quickly shifted his tone of praise to one of indignant blame as COVID-19
spread and devastated the U.S. On March 18, 2020, Trump tweeted: “I have always treated the
Chinese Virus very seriously, and have done a very good job from the beginning, including my
very early decision to close the ‘borders’ from China…” (Sippell). While his explanation for the
term was based on geographical origin— “It’s not racist at all…It comes from China—that’s
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why. It comes from China. I want to be accurate…” (Choi)—Trump’s coinage of COVID-19 as
the “Chinese virus” aligned with his narrative of pointing an accusatory finger towards China.
Further Tweets further confirmed Trump’s intentional linkage of China with COVID-19,
suggesting that his repetitive and frequent use of the referent was not unintentional. These
included the following on May 28, 2020: “All over the World the CoronaVirus, a very bad “gift”
from China, marches on. Not good!” (Sippell), July 5, 2020: “New China Virus Cases up
(because of massive testing), deaths are down…” (Sippell), and July 20, 2020: “We are United in
our effort to defeat the Invisible China Virus…” (Sippell). Trump and his administration’s
attribution of blame intensified when Trump himself fell ill from COVID-19. Republican
Senator Kelly Loeffler tweeted “…China gave this virus to our President…WE MUST HOLD
THEM ACCOUNTABLE…” and Trump campaign fundraiser Blair Brandt claimed “…Chinese
Communist Party has biologically attacked our President…” (Griffiths). Only a few days after
being discharged from the hospital, Trump concretized his blame narrative by promising revenge
on China: “We are making tremendous progress with this horrible disease that was sent over by
China…China will pay a big price for what they did to the world and to us…” (Walsh).

As the representative leader of the U.S., Trump’s preference for referring to COVID-19 as the
“Chinese virus” and “Wuhan virus” was never private, but glaringly public. However, the
moment Trump chose to utilize his overt blame narrative and scapegoating strategy during G7
meetings, he officialized the monstrification of A/AAPI. No longer was “Chinese virus” a part of
internet slang, that while still harmful, could be potentially dismissed due to the casualness of
Twitter—it became the primary language used to represent the United States’ stance on COVID19 amidst global elite discourse. The controversial nomenclature played an especially prominent
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role in March 2020, as “…Foreign leaders from the group of Seven countries failed to agree on a
joint declaration because of disputes on what to call the coronavirus pandemic…” (Choi). As
demonstrated by the stalling that occurred during the G7, naming is powerful. The overt
enthymematic racism imbued within the phrase “Chinese virus” contained enough virulence to
halt progress on geopolitical decisions. Regardless, Trump continued to use this language even
after admonishment from critics warning of xenophobic behavior. In September 2020, Trump
again referred to COVID-19 as the “China virus” during his U.N. speech and suggested: “That
Chinese government and World Health Organization—which is virtually controlled by China—
falsely declared that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission. Later, they falsely
said people without symptoms would not spread the disease…” (Neuman). Disregarding the
potential validity of his claims, Trump’s persistent association of “China virus” with his blaming
China for COVID-19 creates avenues for scapegoating anyone with connections to China,
legitimately assumed or not.
In short, the Trump administration’s insistence on using the terms “Wuhan virus” and “China
virus” in these official international declarations gave them power. “Wuhan virus” and “Chinese
virus” could no longer be dismissed as jokes or casual labels. It is for this main reason—that
being the combination of Trump’s authority as President combined with the very public and
frequently expressed nature of his remarks—that Trump’s Tweets and quotations from G7
meetings are crucial tipping points in the explicit monstrification of A/AAPI. In other words,
through the monster trope, “Wuhan virus” and “Chinese virus” become more than just
descriptive labels for COVID-19. By referring to the virus as such, it gives COVID-19 agency,
scapegoating ability, and ultimately the rhetorical capabilities to erase humanity through
amplifying monstrosity. Trump’s language is overt rhetoric that encapsulates centuries-old
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stigmas towards Asians in America, the very human fear of the savage unknown, and the
tensions rife in current geopolitics into a neat little package perfect for mass media circulation.
Even if one were to buy Trump’s defense that “China virus” does indeed impart more accurate
data about the virus, they might assume that should any scapegoating occur, it would solely
target the Chinese. However, hate crimes do not only happen to Chinese people. The trope of
Asia as monolith rears its head here—anyone who fits American physical perceptions of Asianness becomes “Chinese” and therefore, a source of COVID-19, regardless of their actual cultural
background or relationship to China. Such racialization, dependent on assumed phenotypical
categorization, plays directly into the perpetual foreigner trope, further alienating the Asian
Other from the familiar American. As professor Wenshan Jia and scholar Fangzhu Lu observe:
“…it is President Donald J. Trump who used “Chinese virus” that triggered the American
society’s anti-Asian sentiment. When influential politicians label a group of people in a racist
term, it acts like a call for their constituents to take up racist action against the members of the
target group…” (Jia and Lu). In other words, Trump’s overt rhetoric builds upon the complex
web of tropes which historically acted to suppress A/AAPI through a homogenous, perilous,
permanently foreign identity. During the rising tensions and panic era of COVID-19, his
preferred terminology of “Chinese virus” creates an excuse for people to act upon their prior
assumptions that all Asians are the same, or more specifically, that all Asians are Chinese—a
synecdoche that swallows A/AAPI individuality all to create an easily identifiable scapegoat for
the hardships of the pandemic. This synecdoche has a second violent consequence. A/AAPI
distract themselves by seeking to separate themselves from the monstrified Chinese in “China
virus,” diminishing the root problem of stopping violent hate crimes and instead exacerbating
further discord among Asian communities.
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Complicit Rhetoric: “Sick Man,” “Chicom,” and Hard Work
As COVID-19’s rapid infection spurred a wake of socioeconomic disruption and geopolitical
tension, the American public demanded any information surrounding the novel coronavirus and
the potential threats it harbored, biological or otherwise. Among the cascade of articles released
every hour crowded with updated outbreak statistics, stories of tragic loss, and discussions of
international relations implications, one particular opinion piece released by the Wall Street
Journal turned attention with its complicit rhetoric, first and foremost present in its harmfully
troped, racialized title: “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia” (Mead). The title itself relies upon
the trope of yellow peril discussed before, the historical association of Asians with disease. This
play on words posited a specific target on China and Chinese communities, drawing attention
from Chinese scholars who identified such references as “…a subtle call to the world to isolate
China or put China into quarantine so that China would no longer be strategic competitor for the
United States…” (Jia and Lu). Beyond the title, editor and columnist Walter Russell Mead’s
commentary of China’s unstable financial status parallels COVID-19 economic impacts with the
infamous bat soup and pangolin rumors: “The mighty Chinese juggernaut has been humbled this
week, apparently by a species-hopping bat virus...”, and “China’s financial markets are probably
more dangerous in the long run than China’s wildlife markets” (Mead). These sentences validate
early attributions of COVID-19 to the long-held American stereotype concerning Chinese
diets—namely, that Chinese people eat weird food. This might seem silly at surface value, but
this assumption employs the monster trope. The association of Chinese consuming foods
considered unfit for most people only serves to further establish their status as foreign Other,
monsters who devour what humans should not.
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Even within spaces meant to expose discrimination and violence against A/AAPI, harmful
synecdoche occurs via appeals to free speech. During the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in March 2021, Representative Chip Roy of Texas
presented: “…I’m not going to be ashamed of saying I oppose the Chicoms, I oppose the
Chinese Communist Party and when we say things like that and we’re talking about that, we
shouldn’t be worried about having a committee of members of Congress policing our rhetoric
because some evildoers go engage in some evil activity, as occurred in Atlanta, Georgia.
Because when we start policing free speech, we’re doing the very thing that we’re condemning
when we condemn what the Chinese Communist Party does to their country…” (Roy, HJS).
Synecdoche is a master trope of rhetoric, wherein a part comes to represent a whole. Though it is
often used colloquially or as a literary device, when used in arguments like Roy’s, synecdoche
has the capability to destructively erase identity. Within Roy’s assertion, the Chinese Communist
Party comes to represent all Chinese or those who appear Chinese, regardless of their actual
political affiliation or cultural sympathies to the Chinese government. He utilizes the common
American rejection of Communist ideology to justify harmful language towards A/AAPI, such as
the slur Chicoms. Further context of the evil activity he references serves to confirm the
dangerous synecdoche—half of the Atlanta spa shooting victims were not Chinese: “An official
from the South Korean Consulate in Atlanta, citing the Foreign Ministry in Seoul,
confirmed…that four of the eight killed in the shooting spree were ethnic Koreans…” (Fausset).
In light of this information, Roy’s synecdoche no longer contains itself to blame the Chinese
Communist Party but legitimizes violence against any A/AAPI who fit observational criteria of
East Asian-ness.
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Analysis of complicit rhetoric is crucial to revealing and attempting to dismantle the monster
trope and scapegoating of A/AAPI, especially within A/AAPI communities. In other words,
A/AAPI themselves often internalize and so perpetuate harmful tropes like the perpetual
foreigner and model minority myth. Former Democratic candidate Andrew Yang’s article, “We
Asian Americans are not the virus, but we can be part of the cure,” exemplifies this complicity.
Granted, the first part of his title does attempt to invalidate the overt association of A/AAPI to
COVID-19, like that found in Trump’s Tweets. In his writing, Yang attempts to rally and
encourage A/AAPI amidst the anxiety and fear of rising COVID-19 and hate crime cases alike.
He references his answer to a question posed while he was running for president, “How do we
keep the coronavirus from inciting hostility toward Asians in this country?”. Yang responds:
“The truth is that people are wired to make attributions based on appearance, including race. The
best thing that could happen for Asians would be to get this virus under control so it isn’t a
problem anymore. Then any racism would likely fade” (Yang). To be fair, as Yang himself notes
following this quote, his response occurred before Trump publicly labeled COVID-19 as the
“Chinese virus.” Regardless, Yang’s approach to the question frames the racism and xenophobia
as a problem that can be mitigated by stopping COVID-19, rather than as a problem itself. He
acknowledges that synecdoche of phenotypic perceptions act as foundation for racial
assumptions, but his argument mainly pivots around the idea that managing COVID-19 will
provide solvency for anti-Asian sentiments.

Yang does attempt to de-monstrify and re-humanize A/AAPI, but his suggestions still articulate
Asian Americans as Other. He does so by calling for Asian Americans to work harder: “We
Asian Americans need to embrace and show our American-ness in ways we never have before.
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We need to step up, help our neighbors, donate gear, vote, wear red-white-and-blue, volunteer,
fund aid organizations, and do everything in our power to accelerate the end of this crisis. We
should show without a shadow of a doubt that we are Americans who will do our part for our
country in this time of need” (Yang). Assuming, as he mentions within the text, that Yang’s
primary audience are Asian Americans—a term which typically refers to either natural born or
legalized citizens of Asian descent—this begs the question…why should Asian Americans have
to prove their American-ness more than any other racial group? Yang’s plea implies that Asian
Americans lack American-ness, and that in times of discrimination and hate, the perpetual
foreigner must provide evidence for their right to belong through loyal, dedicated, hard work.
The model minority must continue to act as model in order for Americans to look past their
foreign status—or else, they become monster.

Resistant Rhetoric: Cultural Inoculations

But not every speech or article about COVID-19 contained overt or complicit rhetorics against
A/AAPI. During the previously mentioned March 2021 House Judiciary Subcommittee hearing
regarding discrimination and violence against A/AAPI, Congressman Grace Meng of New York
adopts a spirit of resistant rhetoric as she directly responds to Rep. Chip Roy of Texas. She
uncovers the synecdoche he uses to justify hatred of A/AAPI because of an implied association
to the Chinese Communist Party, revealing this logic as not only faulty but as enabling hate
crimes: “I want to go back to something that Mr. Roy said earlier, your president and your party
and your colleagues can talk about issues with any other country that you want, but you don’t
have to do it by putting a bull’s-eye on the back of Asian Americans across this country, on our
grandparents, on our kids. This hearing was to address the hurt and pain of our community and to

25

find solutions and we will not let you take our voice away from us” (Meng, HJS). In her critique
of Roy’s argument, Meng refocuses attention to A/AAPI, drawing a distinction between Asian
Americans and China, more specifically, the Chinese government. By doing so, she clearly
identifies victims of anti-Asian hate crimes as scapegoats for American scorn of Communist
ideology. In summation, Meng’s comments eliminate erasure of A/AAPI in two ways. First, she
unravels the Asia as monolith trope by distinguishing Asian Americans as a group of people
separate from American perceptions of all East Asian and East Asian-passing peoples as
Chinese, and by extension, surrogates for the Chinese Communist Party. Second, Meng
advocates for A/AAPI by demanding physical and emotional space for A/AAPI voices.

Additionally, amidst the elite messaging and monstrification that enables overt and complicit
violence against A/AAPI, there also emerge opportunities for future rhetorical resistance—a
cultural vaccine to inoculate American society, better protecting those most vulnerable from the
virulence of the monster trope moving forward. As Hong points out, “…the coronavirus at least
burned away any illusions that East Asians are almost white…I kept imagining the coronavirus
as an irradiating purple light lancing through the cracks of our white-supremacist world” (Hong).
COVID-19 was not the origin of anti-Asian hate. COVID-19 was a catalyst for exposing the
deeply rooted erasure of discrimination towards A/AAPI, and Trump’s justification for
scapegoating through repeated use of “China virus” was the last drop that caused the boiling
cauldron of xenophobia to finally boil over. The consequent monstrification and rising trend of
hate crimes against A/AAPI communities forced American society at large and A/AAPI as
individuals to remember that A/AAPI are minorities too, manipulated by the same systematic
racism that pits marginalized groups against one another: “White supremacy ensures that once
the pressure of persecution is lifted even a little from one group, that group will then fall upon
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the newly targeted group out of relief and out of a frustrated misplaced rage that can never touch,
let alone topple, the real enemy” (Hong). Hong writes her worries about her family’s health, her
anger over racially motivated violence, and her confusion the slur “Chink” resurged. But she also
writes with Burke’s comedic corrective, acknowledging how “…In the past, I had a habit of
minimizing anti-Asian racism because it had been drilled into me early on that racism against
Asians didn’t exist…I’ve been conditioned to think my second-class citizenry was low on the
scale of oppression and therefore not worth bringing up…” (Hong). Hong recognizes her own
internalization of harmful tropes like the model minority myth, and by doing so, resists
remaining entrenched within the myth. Rather than solely dwell on the tragedies and
victimization of A/AAPI, this writing encourages us as readers to reflect on our actions, arguably
one of the first and most important conditions for long lasting social change.

Conclusion

To conclude my thesis, I hope to have shown how elite messaging utilizes the monster trope, in
its employment of precedent anti-Asian metaphors and synecdoches, to scapegoat A/AAPI
communities as cause and embodiment of COVID-19. Through analysis of overt and complicit
rhetoric, I demonstrate how enthymematic referents like “Chinese virus” and similar assumptions
relying on anti-Asian sentiments justify violence against A/AAPI, both from external agents and
internalized. However, I also provide instances of resistant rhetorics that push against the
monster trope, beginning to dismantle its monstrosity and inoculating audiences to the
pandemics of racism and xenophobia.
Part of the monster trope’s dangerously effective persuasion lies in its instinctive implicit call to
retributive action. It is a tale as old as time, a prevalent theme popularized through the ages of
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ancient mythologies, classic fairy tales, and modern fantastical epics. Heroes exemplify virtues,
heroes unify against a common enemy, heroes do not tolerate evil—and so heroes must defeat
monsters. When a particular agent becomes monstrified, they not only lose their humanity, but
they become an intentional target for hatred and violence. In this scenario, Trump presents
himself and his allies as the heroes fighting against COVID-19, which by extension of his using
“Chinese virus” also paints him as oppositional to those characterized as the disease. The
monster trope does far more than remove what makes one human from themselves. It transforms
what is left into something vicious that warrants persecution.

And thus, monstrification is a necessary enabler of human v. human violence. It is a rhetorical
technique on which we unconsciously rely, an easy way to turn attention against a particular
agent without the penalty of guilt. As humans, how can we provoke hatred against other humans
through any argument referencing and acknowledging our shared humanity? For any violence we
would stoke in this paradigm must also, in some sense, reflect upon ourselves. Put differently,
most people feel uncomfortable committing acts of violence against perceived enemies if they
recognize that Other as human. It is when we are confronted with the humanity buried beneath
monstrification that we, both personally and as a collective society, can begin to recognize the
injustice of our violent actions.
“Chinese virus” cannot be passed off as a joke. Trump’s referent painted neon flashing arrows to
a target already placed on backs of A/AAPI. As Chairman Steve Cohen summarized in his House
Judiciary Subcommittee opening statement: “Anti-Asian hate did not begin with the COVID-19
pandemic and will not end then the pandemic is over, All the pandemic did was exacerbate latent
anti-Asian prejudice that have long—long and ugly history in America” (Cohen, HJS). It is not
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enough to condemn overt anti-Asian rhetoric. Pointing our pitchforks towards elites only
perpetuates the monster trope’s capability for physical and cultural violence. As contributors to
American public discourse, we must learn to recognize and critique complicit rhetoric. For those
who identify as A/AAPI, we need to guard against and resist our own complicity.
In her work Sorties, rhetorician Helene Cixous explicates history’s paradox of otherness, the way
in which humans as individuals and communities conceptualize the philosophical nothingness of
Other via violent power: “The paradox of otherness is that, of course, at no moment in History is
it tolerated or possible as such. The other is there only to be reappropriated, recaptured, and
destroyed as other” (Cixous, 71). Cixous seeks remedy to this paradox of otherness through a
writing that desires recognition and knowing of the other, wherein “...each would take the risk of
other, of difference, without feeling threatened by the existence of an otherness, rather,
delighting to increase through the unknown that is there to discover, to respect, to favor, to
cherish” (Cixous, 78). This is a writing that may begin to dismantle the monster trope’s tangled
web of metaphor and synecdoche, and our invented human necessity to surrender natural
cacophonous difference for the sake of a granular generic understanding.

Perhaps there are ways the monster trope can be used positively. Perhaps the fear garnered via
COVID-19’s monstrification was the motivation humans needed to take the virus seriously.
Perhaps we can signify the monster trope otherwise—in our monstrification of A/AAPI, we are
the real monsters. Consider Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, the story of a scientist who defied
nature in pursuit of manufacturing the perfect man, who deemed his creation a monster that he
needed to escape and destroy. The name Frankenstein brings to mind the popular Halloween icon
derived from Shelley’s work, a horrific, stumbling green monster brought back from the dead.
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But in the original text, Frankenstein is not the monster’s name. It is the name of the scientist.
When using the monster trope to justify violence, who is the real monster: those monstrified, or
those employing monstrification?
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